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Abstract
An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the ﬁr s td a t ea n da
ﬁnite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production
plans by voting — one share, one vote — and at ρ-majority stable stock mar-
ket equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ρ × 100




S − J +1
,
where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of ﬁrms.
Moreover, an example shows that ρ-majority stable stock market equilibria
need not exist for smaller ρ’s.
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11. Introduction
If markets are complete consumers have, at equilibrium, common shadow
prices — namely the vector of market prices. Shareholders therefore agree
that ﬁrms should maximize proﬁts with respect to these common prices.
However, if markets are incomplete, shadow prices need not be common.
Thus, shareholders typically disagree on the production plans to be chosen.
Therefore several suggestions have been put forward as reasonable objectives
for ﬁrms.
It seems natural that production plans should satisfy the Pareto criterion:
no alternative production plan results in some shareholders being better oﬀ
and none being worse oﬀ. Unfortunately, the Pareto criterion is weak: pro-
duction plans satisfy the Pareto criterion if and only if they maximize proﬁts
with respect to some price vector in the convex hull of the shadow prices of
the shareholders.
Dr` eze (1974) and Grossman & Hart (1979) agree that production plans
should satisfy the Pareto criterion and propose that side payments between
shareholders should be allowed. Dr` eze (1974) (resp. Grossman & Hart
(1979)) suggests that production plans should reﬂect the preferences of ﬁ-
nal (resp. initial) shareholders: this may be interpreted as production plans
being determined after markets close (resp. before markets open).
Dr` eze (1985) suggests that production plans should be stable for simple
majority voting between shareholders and unanimity between board members
(without side payments): no alternative production plan results in all board
members and a majority of shareholders being better oﬀ.A si nD r ` eze (1974)
production plans reﬂect preferences of ﬁnal shareholders. It appears to be a
drawback that unanimity between board members is essential for existence
of equilibria. DeMarzo (1993) investigates some properties of equilibria at
which production plans are stable for simple majority voting between share-
holders. The largest shareholder typically determines the production plan
at these equilibria. However, such equilibria need not exist, as known from
the literature on aggregation of preferences in multi-dimensional settings (see
2Plott (1967)).
The present paper addresses the problem of existence. Since the set
of production plans is multi-dimensional, super majority voting rules are
needed to ensure existence of equilibria (as, e.g., in Greenberg (1979) or
Caplin & Nalebuﬀ (1988, 1991)). The concept of ρ-majority stable stock
market equilibrium (or ρ-MSSME) is introduced: At a ρ-MSSME, consumers
do not want to change their portfolios, ﬁrms are not able to make more
than ρ×100 percent of their shareholders better oﬀ by changing production
plans and ﬁnally, markets clear. So ρ-MSSME are stable in respect to the
joint operation of both a decentralized market mechanism and a centralized
collective decision mechanism. It is shown that if portfolios are unbounded,
then a ρ-MSSME exists provided that
ρ ≥
S − J
S − J +1
where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of ﬁrms.
The latter result links the extent of the market failure (the degree of mar-
ket incompleteness, S −J) with the coarseness of the aggregated preference:
the more markets fail, the higher the ratio has to be, hence the coarser the ag-
gregated preference. Indeed, the problem with super majority rules with high
ratios is that they are conservative: the status quo tends to be protected. It
has been a long standing idea that less heterogeneous individual preferences
allow for less conservative voting rules. In the present model, the opera-
tion of a market mechanism partially reduces the heterogeneity of individual
preferences over production plans. Indeed, market trading will lead to agree-
ment amongst shareholders on the value of the J traded assets. This implies
that shareholders will only disagree on the value of the (S − J)-dimensional
set of ‘non-marketed’ assets. Thus the relevant ‘disagreement space’ is the
projection of the production space onto this non-marketed space which has
dimension S − J at most. At the extreme, complete markets completely
removes the heterogeneity of individual preferences over production plans:
3shareholders are unanimous1. In case of the degree of market incompleteness
being 1, a ρ-MSSME exists for simple majority voting, i.e. with ρ =1 /2, as
argued by DeMarzo (1993). In case of a more severe degree of market in-
completeness, additional assumptions on the primitive characteristics of the
economy (shape of preferences, distribution of individual characteristics) are
needed to get existence of ρ-MSSME for ratios smaller than the one provided
in the present paper (see Cr` es and Tvede (2001) for existence results with
ratios smaller than two thirds).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the economy and the
notion of a ρ-majority stable stock market equilibrium, where ﬁrms are not
able to make more than ρ × 100 percent of their shareholders better oﬀ by
changing production plans, are introduced. The timing is that production
plans are determined after markets are closed as in Dr` eze (1974, 1985) and
DeMarzo (1993). In Section 3 assumptions are introduced and the main
result of the paper which is the existence of ρ-majority stable stock market
equilibria, is stated. In Section 4 the notion of ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage
equilibrium, where ﬁrms maximize proﬁts with respect to state price vectors
and are not able to make more than ρ × 100 percent of their shareholders
better oﬀ by changing state price vectors, are introduced. Moreover, it is
shown that ρ-majority stable stock market equilibria exist because the two
notions of equilibrium are equivalent and that ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage
equilibria exist. In Section 5 the main result of the paper is extended to other
timings: either production plans are determined before markets are open as in
Grossman & Hart (1979) or while markets open. In both timings shareholders
need to form expectations about how production plans inﬂuence prices and
the notion of competitive price perceptions introduced in Grossman & Hart
(1979) is considered. Finally Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
1A ρ-MSSME with ρ = 0 then exists. Ekern & Wilson (1974) have shown that this
result extends to the case of partial spanning, i.e. the sets of eﬃcient production plans
are subsets of the span of assets. Moreover, existence of ρ-MSSME for ρ =0h o l d si na n y
model with incomplete markets where equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal, e.g.,
under strong conditions for the CAPM (see Borch (1968) and Wilson (1968)).
4The proof of existence of ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibria is in an
appendix.
2. The Economy
Consider an economy with 2 dates, t ∈ {0,1},1s t a t ea tt h eﬁrst date s =0 ,
and S states at the second date s ∈ {1,...,S}. There are: 1 commodity at
every state, I consumers with i ∈ {1,...,I} and J ﬁrms with j ∈ {1,...,J}.
Consumers are characterized by their identical consumption sets X = RS+1,
initial endowments ωi ∈ RS+1, utility functions ui : X → R, and initial
portfolio of shares in ﬁrms δi =( δi1,...,δiJ), where δij ∈ R and
 I
i=1 δij =1
for all j. Firms are characterized by their production sets Yj ⊂ RS+1.
Let q =( q1,...,q J)w h e r eqj ∈ R is the price of shares in ﬁrm j,b et h e
price vector. Consumers choose consumption plans xi ∈ X, and portfolios,
θi ∈ RJ. Firms choose production plans, yj ∈ Yj.





















jθij for all s ≥ 1.
(1)
There are no strategic considerations involved in the choices of portfolios.
The problem of ﬁrm j is more complicated to state because shareholders
vote over production plans. First let Vij : X × R × Yj → Yj be a correspon-
dence which associates a consumption bundle, a stock holding for consumer
i and a production plan for ﬁrm j with the set of production plans for ﬁrm
j that make consumer i better oﬀ,s o
Vij(xi,θij,y j)={y
 
j ∈ Yj|ui(xi +( y
 
j − yj)θij) >u i(xi)}.
Next let vj :
 
i(X ×R)×Yj ×Yj → {1,...,I} be the correspondence which
associates a collection of individual consumption bundles and shares in ﬁrm
5j and a pair of production plans with the set of consumers that are better










i(X ×R)×Yj → Yj be a correspondence which associates
a collection of individual consumption bundles and shares in ﬁrm j and a
production plan for ﬁrm j with the set of production plans for ﬁrm j that
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i(X ×R)×Yj → Yj is the preference of ﬁrm j and the problem
of ﬁrm j given (xi,θij)i is to ﬁnd yj such that P
ρ
j ((xi,θij)i,y j)=∅.
An economic interpretation of the model is that shareholders vote over
production plans after stock markets are closed, because changes in produc-
tion plans are not perceived to inﬂuence prices.
Deﬁnition 1. A ρ-majority stable stock market equilibrium is a price
vector, a collection of individual consumption bundles and portfolios and a
collection of individual production plans (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j) such that:
(C) (¯ xi, ¯ θi) is a solution to the problem of consumer i given (¯ q,(¯ yj)j);
(F) ¯ yj is a solution to the problem of ﬁrm j given (¯ xi, ¯ θij)i,a n d ;
(E)
 




j ¯ yj and
 
i ¯ θij =1 .
3. Existence of Equilibrium
In order to ensure the existence of a ρ-majority stable stock market equilib-
rium the assumptions below are imposed on the consumers, the ﬁrms and
the production sector.
Consumer i is supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
6(A.1) ωi ∈ X;
(A.2) ui is diﬀerentiable ui ∈ C1(X,R);
(A.3) ui has strictly positive derivatives Dui ∈ C(X,R
S+1
++ );
(A.4) ui is quasi-concave, so ui((1 − t)xi + tx 
i) ≥ min{ui(xi),u i(x 
i)} for all
t ∈ [0,1], and;
(A.5) u
−1
i (a) is bounded from below for all a ∈ R.
(A.1)-(A.5) are standard. However, the assumption that consumption sets
are unbounded from below is not completely standard, but the assumption
ensures that for all collections of individual production plans consumers are
able to ﬁnance consumption plans in their consumption sets. Since ﬁrms
aim at ﬁnding a production plans such that they are not able to increase
the utility level of more than ρ × 100 percent of the shareholders rather
than maximize proﬁts, the value of a ﬁrm may be negative. Therefore, if
consumption sets are bounded from below, then consumers may not be able
to ﬁnance any consumption plans in their consumption sets.
Let Zj ⊂ RS+1 be the set of eﬃcient production plans, so
Zj = {yj ∈ Yj|({yj} + R
S+1
+ ) ∩ Yj = {yj}}
then ﬁrm j is supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.6) the production set Yj is convex and closed, and;
(A.7) the set of eﬃcient production plans Zj is bounded.
Assumption (A.6) is standard, while assumption (A.7) includes “truncated”
production sets such as
{y ∈ R
S+1|y
0 ∈ [y,0] and y
s ≤ (−y
0)
b for all s ∈ {1,...,S}}
where y ≤ 0a n db ∈]0,1].
Moreover, the production sector of the economy is supposed to satisfy the
following assumption:
7(A.8) for all collections of production plans (yj)j,w h e r eyj is in the convex
hull of the closure of the set of eﬃcient production plans yj ∈ co cl Zj,
production plans for date 1 are linearly independent.
Assumption (A.8) excludes that ﬁrms are able to replicate production plans
of each other.
In the rest of the paper (A.1)-(A.8) are supposed to be satisﬁed.
Theorem 1. All economies have a ρ-majority stable stock market equilib-
rium if and only if
ρ ≥
S − J
S − J +1
.
Proof: In the next section, the notion of ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equi-
librium is introduced and it is shown( i nL e m m a1a n dL e m m a2 )t h a ta
ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium is a ρ-majority stable stock market
equilibrium and vice versa and (in Proposion 1) that ρ ≥ (S−J)/(S−J +1)
if and only if all economies have a ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium.
Therefore Theorem 1 follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 in
the next section.
Q.E.D
If (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (E), then gradients (Dui(¯ xi))i are orthogonal


















Therefore gradients are in a S +1− J dimensional subspace of RS+1.L e t
∆ ⊂ R
S+1




µs =1 } and let πi : X → ∆







8Then normalized gradients are in a S −J dimensional subset of the simplex.
In the next section it is shown that the problem of the ﬁrm can be decom-
posed into two: (1) maximizing proﬁts with respect to state price vectors,
and (2) problems of ﬁnding state price vectors which reﬂect the interests of
their shareholders. All shareholders want their own gradients to be the state
price vector for which ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, so, intuitively, the relevant set
of state price vectors is the convex hull of the set of normalized gradients.
Therefore, again intuitively, the relevant set of state price vectors has dimen-
sion S − J at most. In Greenberg (1979), where a society consists of a set
of alternatives B and a ﬁnite set of agents {1,...,L}, who are described by
their preference correspondences R  : B → B, it is shown that there exists a
ρ-majority stable voting equilibrium if and only if ρ ≥ (dim B)/(dim B+1).
The result of Greenberg is applied to the problems of determining state price
vectors for which ﬁrms maximize proﬁts.
4. No-Arbitrage Equilibria
I no r d e rt op r o v i d eap r o o fo fT h e o r e m1a n dt oe x p l o r eh o wﬁrms determine
production plans another notion of equilibrium is introduced.
Let Wi : X×∆ → ∆ be a correspondence which associates a consumption
bundle for consumer i and a state price vector with the set of state price
vectors that are closer to the normalized gradient, so
Wi(xi,µ)={µ
  ∈ ∆| µ
  − πi(xi)  <  µ − πi(xi) }.
Next let wj :
 
i X × ∆ × ∆ → {1,...,I} be a correspondence which asso-
ciates a collection of individual consumption bundles and a pair of state price
vectors with the set of consumers whose normalized gradients are closer to
the latter state price vector than to the former state price vector, so
w((xi)i,µ,µ
 )={i ∈ {1,...,I}|µ
  ∈ Wi(xi,µ)}.
Finally, let Qρ :
 
i(X × R) × ∆ be a correspondence which associates a
collection of individual consumption bundles and portfolios and a state price
9vector with the set of state price vectors are closer to the normalized gradients
























Obviously Wi, w and Qρ are purely artiﬁcial constructions in the sense that
the only information Wi, w and Qρ convey about shareholders is their nor-
malized gradients and portfolios.
Deﬁnition 2. A ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium is a state
price vector, a collection of individual consumption bundles and portfolios
and a collection of individual production plans and state price vectors
(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)
such that:
(C’) (¯ xi, ¯ θi) maximizes the utility of consumer i given (¯ λ,(¯ yj)j),s o(¯ xi, ¯ θi)
















jθij for all s ≥ 1;
(2)
(F’) ¯ yj maximizes the proﬁto fﬁrm j given ¯ µj,s o¯ yj is a solution to
max
yj
¯ µj · yj
s.t. yj ∈ Yj;
(F”) Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)=∅,a n d ;
(E)
 




j ¯ yj and
 
j ¯ θij =1 .
10If there exists a coalition C ⊂ {1,...,I},w h e r e
 
i∈C ¯ θij > ρ
 
i ¯ θij,s u c h
that ¯ µj is not in the convex hull of the gradients of the shareholders in C,
then there exists µj such that  µj − πi(¯ xi)  <  ¯ µj − πi(¯ xi)  for all i ∈ C,s o
µj ∈ Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θi)i, ¯ µj). Therefore ¯ µj has to be in the intersection of the convex
hulls of gradients for coalitions of shareholders with more than ρ×100 percent
of the shares.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below show the equivalence of stock market equi-
libria and no-arbitrage equilibria.
Lemma 1. If (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j) is a ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equi-
librium, then (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j),w h e r e¯ qj =( 1 /¯ λ0)¯ λ·¯ yj,i saρ-majority stable
s t o c km a r k e te q u i l i b r i u m .
Proof: Suppose that (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)i saρ-majority stable no-arbitrage
equilibrium, then (E) in Deﬁnition 1 is satisﬁed. Therefore in order to show
that (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j), where ¯ qj =( 1 /¯ λ0)¯ λ · ¯ yj,i saρ-majority stable stock
market equilibrium it suﬃces to show that (C) and (F) in Deﬁnition 1 are
satisﬁed.
“(C)” Clearly, ¯ λ0 > 0 because (¯ xi, ¯ θi) solves problem (2) given (¯ λ,(¯ yj)j)
and, according to (A.3), gradients are positive vectors. Therefore, according
to Magill & Quinzii (1996), (¯ xi, ¯ θi) is a solution to Problem (1) given (¯ q,(¯ yj)j),
where ¯ qj =( 1 /¯ λ0)¯ λ · ¯ yj,i fa n do n l yi f( ¯ xi, ¯ θi) is a solution to Problem (2)
given (¯ λ,(¯ yj)j).
“(F)” The line of proof is to show that if P
ρ
j ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ yj)  = ∅,t h e n
Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)  = ∅. Suppose that P
ρ
j ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ yj)  = ∅, then there exists
yj ∈ Yj, such that  







For i ∈ vj((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ yj,y j)a n d¯ θij > 0, then
πi(¯ xi) · (yj − ¯ yj) > 0.
11Let zj be the orthogonal projection of yj − ¯ yj on  ¯ µj ⊥,w h e r e ¯ µj ⊥ is
the linear subspace orthogonal to ¯ µj,s o
zj = yj − ¯ yj +
¯ µj · (¯ yj − yj)
¯ µj · ¯ µj
¯ µj,
then ¯ µj ·zj =0a n dπi(¯ xi)·zj ≥ πi(¯ xi)·(yj − ¯ yj). (Indeed, ¯ µj ·(¯ yj −yj) ≥ 0,
because ¯ yj maximizes proﬁtg i v e n¯ µj and, since both πi(¯ xi)a n d¯ µj are vectors
with non-negative coordinates, πi(¯ xi) · ¯ µj ≥ 0.)







· (µj − ¯ µj) > 0.


















j =1 . N e x t ,d e ﬁne (µjn)n by µjn =( 1 /n)µj +( ( n − 1)/n)¯ µj.
Obviously, if there exists an n such that µjn ∈ Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)f o rs o m en,
then the proof is ﬁnished, because Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)  = ∅.
If the sequence (µjn)n converges to ¯ µj, then there exists an N ∈ N such
that if n ≥ N,t h e nµjn ∈ ∆, because ¯ µj is in the interior of the simplex.
(Indeed, ¯ µj is in the convex hull of the normalized gradients of the con-
sumers, because otherwise Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)  = ∅, and, according to (A.3), the
normalized gradients of the consumers are in the interior of the simplex.)







· (µjn − ¯ µj) > 0,
because πi(¯ xi)·zj > 0i fa n do n l yi f( πi(¯ xi)− ¯ µj)·(µj − ¯ µj) > 0. Indeed, easy
12computations yield that












=( πi(¯ xi) − ¯ µj) · (µj − ¯ µj),
because ¯ µj · zj =0 .T h u sµjn ∈ Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)f o rn ≥ max{N,N }.
Q.E.D
The next lemma requires stronger assumptions than Lemma 1: In ad-
dition to (A.1)-(A.8) production sets are supposed to be smooth manifolds
with boundary of dimension S +1 .
Lemma 2. Suppose that production sets Yj are smooth manifolds with bound-
ary of dimension S+1.I f(¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j) is a ρ-majority stable stock mar-
ket equilibrium, then there exist ¯ λ and (¯ µj)j such that (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)
is a ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j)i saρ-majority stable stock market
equilibrium for an economy, where production sets are smooth manifolds with
boundary of dimension S +1,then(E)inDeﬁnition 1 is satisﬁed. Therefore
in order to show that there exists ¯ λ where ¯ qj =( 1 /¯ λ0)¯ λ · ¯ yj,a n d( ¯ µj)j such
that (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)i saρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium it
suﬃces to show that (C’), (F’) and (F”) in Deﬁnition 2 are satisﬁed.
“(C)” A c c o r d i n gt oM a g i l l&Q u i n z i i( 1 9 9 6 ) ,( ¯ xi, ¯ θi) is a solution to Prob-
lem (1) given (¯ q,(¯ yj)j) if and only if (¯ xi, ¯ θi) is a solution to Problem (2) given
(¯ λ,(¯ yj)j), where ¯ λ = πi(¯ xi)f o rs o m ei.
“(F’)” Clearly if (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j)i saρ-majority stable stock market
equilibrium, then ¯ yj is in the set of eﬃcient production plans Zj. Therefore,
there exists ¯ µj ∈ ∆ such that ¯ yj maximizes the proﬁto fﬁrm j given ¯ µj.
“(F”)” The line of proof is to show that if Qρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)  = ∅,t h e n
P
ρ
j ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ yj)  = ∅.S u p p o s et h a tQρ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ µj)  = ∅, then there exists ¯ µj
13such that  














· (µj − ¯ µj) > 0.
Therefore,
(πi(¯ xi) − ¯ µj) · (µj − ¯ µj) > 0,
because
(πi(¯ xi) − ¯ µj) · (µj − ¯ µj) − (πi(¯ xi) −
1
2
(µj +¯ µj)) · (µj − ¯ µj) ≥ 0
if and only if (µj − ¯ µj) · (µj − ¯ µj) ≥ 0. Let zj ∈ ¯ µj ⊥ be deﬁned by
z
s
j =( µj − ¯ µj) − ¯ µj · (µj − ¯ µj),
then πi(¯ xi) · zj > 0, because
πi(¯ xi) · zj =( πi(xi) − ¯ µj) · (µj − ¯ µj).
According to Milnor (1965), the boundary of the production set bd Yj
is a smooth manifold of dimension S, because the production set Yj is a
smooth manifold with boundary of dimension S + 1. Therefore there exist
an open subset A of RS, a neighborhood B of ¯ yj and a diﬀeomorphism
φj : A → B ∩ bd Yj.L e t Tj(¯ yj)b et h et a n g e n ts p a c eo ft h eb o u n d a r y
of the production set bd Yj at ¯ yj,t h e nTj(¯ yj)= ¯ µj ⊥.L e t ¯ aj = φ
−1
j (¯ yj)
and aj = Dφj(¯ yj)−1zj, then there exists n ∈ N such that if n ≥ N,t h e n
¯ a +( 1 /n)aj ∈ A.L e t( yjn)n≥N be deﬁned by yjn = φj(¯ aj +( 1 /n)aj), then
lim
n→∞





n→∞n(yjn − ¯ yj)=zj.
14Hence, there exists N  ∈ N, such that if n ≥ N , πi(¯ xi) · zj > 0a n d¯ θij > 0,
then ui(¯ xi +( yjn − ¯ yj)¯ θij) >u i(¯ xi). Thus, yjn ∈ P
ρ
j ((¯ xi, ¯ θij)i, ¯ yj)f o rn ≥
max{N,N }.
Q.E.D
Dr` eze (1974) suggests that ﬁrms in stock market equilibria should max-















However, it follows from Lemma 2 that at ρ-majority stable stock market
equilibria for economies where the production sets are smooth manifold with
boundary of dimension S +1, production plans maximize proﬁt with respect
to some state price vector in the intersection of the convex hulls of gradients
for coalitions of shareholders with more than ρ × 100 percent of the shares.
For an economy with I =4 ,S − J = 2, so normalized gradients are in a
2-dimensional subset of ∆,a n dρ =2 /3, suppose that ¯ θ1j = ...= ¯ θ4j =0 .25



































Figure 1: Distribution of gradients.
15two or less shareholders are not able to change the outcome, because these
coalitions control less than ρ × 100 percent of the shares. All coalitions of
three or more shareholders are able to change the outcome, because these
coalitions control more than ρ ×100 percent of the shares. Therefore ¯ µj has
to be in the intersection of the convex hulls of gradients for three or more
shareholders and ¯ µj is the only point in the intersection. Obviously ¯ µj is
diﬀerent from the average gradient of the shareholders ¯ µA
j .
Proposition 1. All economies have a ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilib-
rium if and only if
ρ ≥
S − J
S − J +1
.
Remark: Since the proof of Proposition 1 is rather long and not too compli-
cated, it is delegated to the appendix. The proof of the “if” of the assertion
is based on the theorem on existence of equilibria in abstract economies in
Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975) and Theorem 2 on existence of super majority
stable equilibria in societies in Greenberg (1979). The proof of the “only
if” of the assertion is an example of a family of economies in which for all
ρ < (S−J)/(S−J+1) there exist economies which do not have a ρ-majority
stable stock market equilibrium.
End of remark
5. Timing and Price Perceptions
In Section 2 and Section 3, voting is supposed to take place after markets
a r ec l o s e da si nD r ` eze (1985) and DeMarzo (1993). However, voting may
also take place before markets open as in Grossman & Hart (1979), so the
voting weights in ﬁrm j are (δij)i, or while markets are open, so the voting
weights in ﬁrm j are (θij)i. In both cases, shareholders are able to adjust
their portfolios after the outcome of the voting is known, so they need to
form expectations about how the outcome of voting inﬂuences prices. Gross-
man & Hart (1979) introduced the notion of competitive price perceptions,
16where consumers perceive that income vectors are valued by their normalized
gradients. Indeed if (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (C), then consumer i perceives
that a change of production plan from ¯ yj is to yj for ﬁrm j changes the price
from ¯ qj to qj,w h e r eqj =( 1 ) /(π0
i(¯ xi))πi(¯ xi) · yj.
In general, changes of production plans inﬂuence trading opportunities
through two channels: they change the value of portfolios as well as the span
of assets. From this perspective, competitive price perceptions represent an
extreme: if a consumer perceives that a change of a production plan of a ﬁrm
is going to make the consumer better oﬀ, then the consumer perceives that
the change is going to increase the value of the ﬁrm.
If (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (C) and voting takes place before markets
open, then a change for ﬁrm k from ¯ yk to yk is perceived by consumer i to
change the price of ﬁrm k from ¯ qk to qk =( 1 /(π0
i(¯ xi))πi(¯ xi)·yj. Therefore the
change of production plan is perceived by consumer i to result in consumption


















jθij for all s ≥ 1,
where qj =¯ qj and yj =¯ yj for j  = k. Therefore
x
s







j(qj − ¯ qj)δij −
 
j(¯ y0
j − ¯ qj)¯ θij +
 
j(y0







jθij for all s ≥ 1,
and
πi(¯ xi) · (xi − ¯ xi)=πi(¯ xi) · (yk − ¯ yk)δik.
Hence, if the voting weights in ﬁrm j are changed from (¯ θij)i to (δij)i in
Section 2-4, then it follows that all economies have a ρ-majority stable stock
market equilibrium if and only if ρ ≥ (S − J)/(S − J +1 ) . S i n c ev o t i n g
weights (in case voting takes place after markets close and before markets
open) diﬀer, the set of equilibria for the two diﬀerent voting schemes probably
diﬀer.
17If (¯ q,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (C) and voting takes while markets are open,
then a change for ﬁrm k from ¯ yk to yk is perceived by consumer i to change the
price of ﬁrm k from ¯ qk to qk =( 1 /(π0
i(¯ xi))πi(¯ xi)·yj. Therefore the change of
production plan is perceived by consumer i to result in consumption bundle










j ¯ qjδij +
 
j(qj − ¯ qj)¯ θij +
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jθij for all s ≥ 1,
where qj =¯ qj and and yj =¯ yj for j  = k. Therefore
x
s







j(qj − ¯ qj)¯ θij −
 
j(¯ y0
j − ¯ qj)¯ θij +
 
j(y0







jθij for all s ≥ 1,
and
πi(¯ xi) · (xi − ¯ xi)=πi(¯ xi) · (yk − ¯ yk)¯ θik.
Hence, the model in Section 2-4 may reﬂect that either voting takes while
markets are open or after markets are closed. Thus in case voting takes
place while markets are open, all economies satisfying (A.1)-(A.8) have a ρ-
majority stable stock market equilibrium if and only if ρ ≥ (S−J)/(S−J+1).
6. Final remarks
The present paper shows existence of equilibria which are stable with re-
spect to the joint operation of a market mechanism and a voting mechanism
within ﬁrms. Since the set of production plans is multi-dimensional, super
majority voting rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibria. The ratio
proposed here is the upper bound on the lowest io necessary to guarantee
existence; an upper bound obtained by relaxing the assumptions on the prim-
itive characteristics of the economy as much as the usual standards of general
equilibrium theory allow. The literature on social choice yields many ways
18to improve this type of results, through additional assumptions on the shape
of preferences and on the distribution of primitive characteristics (see Cr` es
and Tvede (2001) for existence results with ratios smaller than two thirds).
The fact that the equilibrium concept at stake is based on stability, at
the same time, with respect to both a (decentralized) market mechanism
and a (centralized) collective decision making mechanism is an interesting
feature of the model. Indeed, the society of shareholders studied here is a
coherent laboratory of our societies where both types of resource allocation
mechanisms are intertwined. And the result obtained links the extent of
the market failure with the conservativeness of the voting rule necessary to
ensure existence of equilibria. The present paper reinforces the idea that
the impossibility results that the theory of social choice has proposed over
the last three decades (in the logic of the present study, the necessity of
the super majority rule to be close to unanimity) can be partially resolved
by the operation of a decentralized mechanism for resource allocation that
endogenizes individual preferences over political choices. The proposed ratio
gives, for this laboratory, a measure of this partial resolution.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists of 3 parts: In Part 1, the economy is transformed into
an abstract economy; in Part 2, the abstract economy is shown to have an
20equilibrium and equilibria of abstract economies are shown to be ρ-majority
stable no-arbitrage equilibria of the original economies, and; in Part 3, an
example is provided to show that for all ρ < (S −J)/(S −J +1) there exists
an economy and does not have a ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium.
Hence, Part 1 and Part 2 are the “if” part of the proof and Part 3 is the
“only if” part of the proof.
Part 1: Transformation into an abstract economy
In an abstract economy or generalized game every agent is described by a
strategy set Ak, a constraint correspondence Ck : A → Ak,w h e r eA =
 
k Ak,
and a preference correspondence Qk : A → Ak and an equilibrium is a vector
a =( ak)k such that ak ∈ Ck(a)a n dQk(a) ∩ Ck(a)=∅,f o ra l lk.
There are four categories of agents: an auctioneer, who takes care of (E)
in Deﬁnition 2, I consumers, who take care of (C’) in Deﬁnition 2, J ﬁrms
which takes care of (F’) in Deﬁnition 2, and groups of shareholders which
take care of (F”) in Deﬁnition 2. Indeed, the auctioneer (agent 0) determines
a state price vector in order to maximize the value of excess demand. The
consumers (agent k ∈ {1,...,I}) determine maximal consumption bundles
and portfolios for their preferences. The ﬁrms (agent k ∈ {I +1,...,I+J})
determine production plans that maximize proﬁts with respect to a state
price vector which reﬂect the interests of their shareholders. The groups of
shareholders (agent k ∈ {I+J+1,...,I+2J},o n eg r o u pp e rﬁrm) determine
a state price vector for which ﬁrms maximize proﬁts.
“Auctioneer” For agent k,w h e r ek = 0, let the strategy set Ak ⊂ RS+1
be deﬁned by
Ak = ∆,
let the constraint correspondence Ck : A → Ak be deﬁned by
Ck(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)=Ak
21and let the preference correspondence Qk : A → Ak be deﬁned by
Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)={λ  ∈ Ak|







Clearly, Ak is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and the graph of Qk is
open and λ is not in the convex hull of Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j), because
Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j) is convex and, by construction,
λ / ∈ Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j).
“Consumers” There exists a compact and convex set Ak ⊂ X × RJ such
that if (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)s a t i s ﬁe s( C ’ ) ,( F ’ )a n d( E )i nD e ﬁnition 2, then
(¯ xi, ¯ θi) is in the interior of Ak because of (A.5), (A.7) and (A.8). For agent
k ∈ {1,...,I},w h e r ek = i, let the strategy set Ak ⊂ X × RJ be deﬁned by
Ak = X × R
J,
let the constraint correspondence Ck : A → Ak be deﬁned by
Ck(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)={(x 
i,θ 
i) ∈ Ak|λ · x 
i ≤ λ · ωi +
 







ij for all s ≥ 1}




 ) ∈ Ak|ui(x
 
i) >u i(xi)}.
Clearly, Ak is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and the graph of Qk is
open with (xi,θi)n o ti nt h ec o n v e xh u l lo fQk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)b e c a u s e ,
according to (A.4), Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)i sc o n v e xa n d ,b yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,
(xi,θi) / ∈ Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j).
“Firms” For agent k ∈ {I+1,...,I+J},w h e r ek = I+j, let the strategy
set Ak ⊂ Yj be deﬁned by
Ak =c o c l Zj,
22let the constraint correspondence Ck : A → Ak be deﬁned by
Ck(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)=Ak
and the preference correspondence Qk : A → Ak be deﬁned by
Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)={y
 
j ∈ Ak|µj · (y
 
j − yj) > 0}.
Clearly, Ak is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and the graph of Qk
is open with yj not in the convex hull of Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j), because
Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j) is convex and, by construction,
yj / ∈ Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j).
“Shareholders” For agent k ∈ {I+J+1,...,I+2J},w h e r ek = I+J+j,
let the strategy set Ak ⊂ RS+1 be deﬁned by
Ak = ∆,
let the constraint correspondence Ck : A → Ak be deﬁned by
Ck(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)=c o {π1(x1),...,πI(xI)},
and let the preference correspondence Qk : A → Ak be deﬁned by
Qk(λ,(xi,θi)i,(yj)j,(µj)j)=Q
ρ((xi,θi)i,µ j)
Clearly, Ak is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and the graph of Qk is
open.
Part 2: Existence of a ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium
According to the theorem in Shafer & Sonneschein (1975) (Theorem 19.8
in Border (1985)), there exists (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) ∈ A such that for all
k ∈ {0,...,I+ J}
Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) ∩ Ck(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) = ∅
23which implies that (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) satisﬁes (C’), (F’) and (E) in Def-
inition 2, and for all k ∈ {I + J +1 ,...,I+2 J} either
Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) ∩ Ck(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) = ∅
or
¯ µj ∈ (co Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj))) ∩ Ck(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)).
Below in Corollary 1 which is a corollary to Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979), it
is shown that if (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (C’), (F’) and (E) in Deﬁnition
2, then ¯ µj is not in the convex hull of Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)f o rk ∈ {I +
J +1 ,...,I+2 J}.
Corollary 1. Suppose (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j) satisﬁes (C’), (F’) and (E) in
Deﬁnition 2. Then for k = I + J + j, ¯ µj is not in the convex hull of
Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j).
Proof: Every group of shareholders is transformed into a society a la Green-
berg (1979), where a society consists of a set of alternatives B and a ﬁnite set
of agents {1,...,L}, who are described by their preference correspondences
R  : B → B. Let the correspondence r : B × B → {0,...,L} be deﬁned by
r(µ,µ
 ) = the cardinality of {  ∈ {1,...,L}|µ
  ∈ R (µ)}
and let the correspondence Rρ : B → B be deﬁned by
R
ρ(µ)={µ
  ∈ B|r(µ,µ
 ) > ρL},
then in the proof of Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979) it is shown that if
ρ ≥ (dim B)/(dim B + 1), then µ/ ∈ co Rρ(µ). However, in the proof of
Theorem 2 in Greenberg, all agents have identical voting weights, while in the
present setup the voting weights of shareholders depend on their portfolios.
Therefore, every shareholder is transformed into a number of agents, where
the number of agents depends on the portfolio of the shareholder in order to
apply the proof of Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979).
24For k = I + J + j,l e tB ⊂ ∆ be deﬁned by
B =c o {π1(¯ x1),...,πI(¯ xI)}.
Let [r] ∈ Z be the integer part of r ∈ R and let n satisfy the following
conditions: if ¯ θij > 0, then [¯ θijn] ≥ 1, and; for all subsets of consumers



















i[¯ θijn] ≤ n
 
i ¯ θij(λ,x,y)+ and let the preference correspondence
of agent  ,w h e r e  ∈ L such that
 
a<i[¯ θajn]+1 ≤   ≤
 
a≤i[¯ θajn], be deﬁned
by
R (µ)={µ
  ∈ B| µ
  − πi(¯ xi)  <  µ − πi(¯ xi) },
so R (µ)=Wi(¯ xi,µ) ∩ B and
Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)j) ∩ Ck(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) ⊂ R
ρ(¯ µj).
Therefore, according to the proof of Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979), if ρ ≥
(dim B)/(dim B + 1), then µ/ ∈ co Rρ(µ).
If (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (C’) in Deﬁnition 2, then ¯ λ0 > 0b e c a u s e ,
according to (A.3), gradients are positive vectors. Therefore πi(¯ xi) is orthog-




















because (¯ xi, ¯ θi) is a solution to Problem (1) given (¯ q,(¯ yj)j)w h e r e¯ qj =
(1/¯ λ0)¯ λ· ¯ yj if and only if (¯ xi, ¯ θi) is a solution to Problem (1) given (¯ λ,(¯ yj)j).
25Moreover, if (¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (F’) in Deﬁnition 2, then, ac-
cording to (A.8), the dividend vectors are linearly independent. Hence,
dim B ≤ S − J,s oi fρ ≥ (S − J)/(S − J + 1), then µ/ ∈ co Rρ(µ). Thus, ¯ µj
is not in the convex hull of Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j).
Q.E.D
According to Corollary 1, ¯ µj is not in the convex hull of Qk(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)
for k = I + J + j,s o( ¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj)j,(¯ µj)) satisﬁes (F”) in Deﬁnition 2.
Therefore, Corollary 1 implies that the abstract economy has an equilibrium
and, by construction, an equilibrium of the abstract economy is a ρ-majority
stable no-arbitrage equilibrium of the economy.
Part 3: An example showing that the bound is binding
Consider a family of economies parametrized by γ =( α,β)w h e r eα,β ≥ 0,
with I = S−J+1 consumers. The consumers have identical utility functions
ui : RS+1 → R deﬁned by
ui(xi)={t ∈ R|x
s




i − t)=0 },
and identical initial portfolios of shares δi =( 1 /I)(1,...,1).
In order to deﬁne initial endowments and productions sets, suppose that










for all s. Let initial endowments (ωα
i )i be deﬁned such that  ωα








s ˜ yjδij.M o r e o v e r ,i fα > 0, then the
normalized gradients (π(˜ xα
i ))i are supposed to be orthogonal to the dividend























26such that the convex hull of the normalized gradients co {(π(˜ xα
i ))i} is a non-
empty simplex of dimension S − J which contains the center e =( 1 /(S +
1))(1,...,1) of ∆. Let production sets (Y
β
j )j be deﬁned by
Y
β
j = {yj ∈ R
S+1| yj − (1 − β)˜ yj ≤β ˜ yj } − R
S+1
+ .
Corollary 2 below is a corollary to Theorem 1 in Greenberg (1979).
Corollary 2. For γ where α > 0,i f¯ λ = e and ¯ xα
i =˜ xα
i and ¯ θi = δ for all i
and ¯ yj =˜ yj and ¯ µj = e for all j,t h e n(¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j) is a ρ-majority
stable no-arbitrage equilibrium if and only if ρ ≥ (S − J)/(S − J +1 ) .
Proof: First, it is shown that (¯ λ,(¯ xα
i , ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (C’), (F’) and
(E) for all γ. Second, it is shown that (¯ λ,(¯ xα
i , ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (F”) for
all γ where α > 0, if and only if ρ ≥ (S − J)/(S − J +1 ) .
“(C’), (F’) and (E)” Clearly, (¯ λ,(¯ xα
i , ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)s a t i s ﬁes (C’), (F’) and
(E), because the normalized gradients (π(¯ xα
i ))i are orthogonal to the dividend
vectors (˜ dj)j, the tangent space of the boundary of the production set at ¯ y
γ
j










“(F”)” Clearly for all µj ∈ ∆ where µj  =¯ µj,t h e r ee x i s t sa tl e a s to n e
consumer k,s u c ht h a tµj / ∈ Wk(¯ xα
k, ¯ µj), because ¯ µj is in the convex hull of







S − J +1
.
Hence, if ρ ≥ (S − J)/(S − J +1 ) ,t h e nQρ((¯ xα
i , ¯ θi)i, ¯ µj)=∅.
There exists µj in the convex hull of the normalized gradients co {(πi(¯ xα
i ))i}
such that µj ∈ Wi(¯ xα
i , ¯ µj) for all but one consumer k, because the convex






S − J +1
.
Hence, if ρ < (S − J)/(S − J + 1), then Qρ((¯ xα
i , ¯ θi)i, ¯ µj)  = ∅.
27Q.E.D
For γ where α = β =0 ,i f( ¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)i saρ-majority stable
no-arbitrage equilibrium, then ¯ xi =˜ xα
i =˜ ω +
 
j ˜ yjδij and θi = δi for all i
and yj =˜ yj and µj = e for all j, because the allocation is Pareto optimal
and all consumers are identical and have normalized gradients e.
Let SJ be a subset of {1,...,S} with J elements such the production
plans for date 1 in the states in SJ are linearly independent. Then for γ
where α = β =0 ,( ( λs)s∈SJ,(xi,θi)i) where (C’) and (E) are satisﬁed, is
regular in (λs)s∈S\SJ and (ωi)i. Therefore there exists ¯ α > 0s u c ht h a tf o ra l l
γ where α ∈]0, ¯ α[a n dβ =0 ,i f( ¯ λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)i saρ-majority stable
no-arbitrage equilibrium, then ¯ xi =˜ xα
i and ¯ θi = δ for all i,¯ yj =˜ yj and
¯ µj = e for all j and ρ ≥ (S − J)/(S − J + 1). Hence for all ˜ α where
¯ α > ˜ α > 0, and ε > 0, there exists ¯ β > 0s u c ht h a tf o ra l lγ where α =˜ α and
¯ β > β > 0, if (λ,(¯ xi, ¯ θi)i,(¯ yj, ¯ µj)j)i saρ-majority stable equilibrium, then
ρ > (S−J)/(S−J +1)−ε, because the equilibrium correspondence is upper
hemi-continuous in β.T h u sf o ra l lρ < (S − J)/(S − J +1 ) ,t h e r ee x i s t sa n
economy which does not have a ρ-majority stable no-arbitrage equilibrium.
28